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LHD-TESS (TEion Seigyo System), utilizes the "open 
system", is designed to have high reliability and availability 
since the control system failure may result in significant 
damage and/or loss to the LHD operation. Spatial 
redundancy masks any error from programing as well as 
failed components in terms of autom"atic switch over. 
However, the system has to take into accounts of some 
emergency situations such as, magnet quench, power 
outage. These events are inevitable so that the sequence 
programs has to minimize any damage to the apparatus. 
Sequence programs against these failures are developed 
and implemented to the each subsystem. 
I. Coil Quench 
Even though the superconducting coils are designed to 
satisfy fully cryostable conditions, the coils may quench 
because of training or some other transient disturbances. 
Cryogenic system has to be protected in the case of quench, 
which results in high-pressure generation due to Joule 
heating and/or AC losses. Heat generation rates are 
depending on the transport current to the magnets. 
Sequence" programs are considered based upon the transport 
current to each superconducting coil. 
Fig. 1 shows a flow chart for the case of quench. 
According to the Fig. 1, LHD-TESS receives I Q digital 
signal from the main control room, the integrated controller 
send "discharge sequence flags to subsystems. The 
fundamental design concept is fairly simple. 
Superconducting coils are isolated from helium 
refrigerator/liquefier and any pressure increase due to 
Fig. 1. Discharge Sequence Flowchart. 
discharge within the coil is relieved through relief valves. 
Otherwise, the helium refrigerator/liquefier operation is 
failed due to compressor trip and/or turbine trip. The 
former situation is primarily caused by the large quantity of 
gaseous helium return from the helical coil. The later 
situation is associated with supercritical helium pressure 
increase within the poloidal coils. 
To avoid turbine failure, poloidal coils are also isolated 
in terms of bypath line for the supercritical helium. Since 
the outlet of turbine #6 and #7 are directly connected to the 
coils. Therefore, inlet and outlet valves for poloidal coil 
system are closed with 15 min. ramp speed. A bypath valve 
is opened simultaneously as inlet/outlet valves. These 
operations protect any failure for the turbines. Any pressure 
instability associated with bypath line operation has to be 
controlled by the operators. 
II. Power Outage 
In the case of power outage, the main compressors of 
helium refrigerator are failed and a recovery compressor 
takes over the gaseous helium recovery operation. The 
integrated controller sends emergency signal to the 
subsystem and the sequence programs are executed to 
isolate each system. Any pressure build up in the system 
are relieved in terms of relief valves, which are controlled 
with setting pressure values. As a result, subsystems are 
now in the self sustaining mode. 
Liquid helium evaporation from superconducting busline 
system is recovered as suction pressure of recovery 
compressor becomes 0.15 MPa. Poloidal coil and Helical 
coil system are followed as the suction pressure becomes 
0.12 MPa. These operations are implemented 
independently to the each system. 
LHD-TESS is now considered to have high reliability 
" against failures. However, the system still required to 
develop automatic recovery mode after the failure. 
Fig. 2. Power Failure Sequence Flowchart. 
59 
